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EDITORIAL
With this issue the 9oth Volume of the REvIEw is completed. The
War has already affected the Law School, and it thus seems appropriate
now to advise our readers of our plans for future publication. In consider-
ing the publication schedule for Volume 91, the Board was confronted with
two najor problems: a reduction of the Editorial Board, occasioned by the
withdrawal of students for service in the Armed Forces; and the recently-
announced accelerated program of the Law School, which, by calling for a
full-term summer session, necessitated a corresponding alteration of our
schedule. We are, therefore, pleased to announce that Volume 91 of the
REvIEW will contain the usual eight issues-the first appearing August i,
r942, the remaining seven being published so as to conclude the Volume by
June, 1943.
NOTES
Eligibility of Strikers and Strikebreakers to Vote in Election
Held During Currency of Economic Strike
The topic for discussion herein is limited to the eligibility of strikers
and persons hired to replace strikers, in a dispute in which the employer
has committed no unfair labor practice,' to vote in an election to determine
the exclusive representative of the employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining.2
RULE OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The pertinent provisions of the National Labor Relations Act 8 are as
follows. Section 9 (a) 4 incorporates the majority rule in collective bar-
gaining, provides that the exclusive bargaining representatives of all the
employees in the appropriate unit shall be those representatives "designated
or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees" in the unit. Section 9 (c) 5 empowers the NLRB to determine
the exclusive representative, provides that the NLRB "may take a secret
ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertin [sic] such
representatives." Section 2 (3)6 of the Act defines employee: "The term
'employee' shall include any employee, . . . and shall include any indi-
vidual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice . . ."
The NLRB has held from the beginning that where an election is ordered
while a strike is current, the strikers are entitled to vote.7 It was likewise
i. Such a strike is commonly called an "economic strike" as distinguished from an
"unfair labor practice strike." It will be hereinafter referred to by that designation.
2. The problem is discussed in Recent Trends in Construction of tlw Wagner Act-I,
io I'r. JuRID. ASS'N BuLr. No. 4 (Oct. 1941) 33, 36-38.
3. 49 STAT. 449-457 ('935), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ I51-166 (Supp. I940).
4. Id. at 453, 29 U. S. C. A. at § 159.
5. Ibid.
6. Id. at 450, 29 U. S. C. A. at § i52.
7. Solomon Manufacturing Co., 3 N. L. R. B. 926 (1937) ; Saxon Mills, I N. L.
L B. 153 (1936). (947)
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early established that in the case of an unfair labor practice strike, the
strikers were entitled to vote in an election and the replacements were not.8
The question of who, as between strikers and replacements, should be
entitled to vote in an election ordered while an economic strike is current,
was first squarely presented to the NLRB in the case of A. Sarorius & Co.,
Inc.9 Under the terms of its original order both strikers and those hired
to replace the strikers were eligible to vote. Upon reconsideration, how-
ever, the Board in a supplemental decision held that only strikers were
entitled to vote, correlatively that replacements could not vote. The Sar-
torius doctrine was followed in subsequent representation cases 10 until the
recent change in the personnel of the Board, which occurred with the
replacement of Warren Madden by Harry A. Millis."
A different attitude toward the question was first indicated in Eastern
Box Co.12 In that case two unions claimed majority support, and the com-
pany and the unions entered a consent agreement to hold an election. One
union withdrew its consent, whereupon the company refused to proceed
until all the parties could agree. The other union then struck to obtain
recognition. The Board, in ordering an election, ruled that those eligible
should be determined from the payroll prior to the strike. In the majority
opinion, the Sartorius case was not mentioned. The emphasis was placed
upon the facts that "the strike grew out of and is an integral part of the
representation dispute which is before us for consideration"; 's and that
the company stated that it would "reinstate the striking employees in so far
as possible on some impartial basis to be determined in the future." 1- In
a concurring opinion Mr. Smith declared that the case fell squarely within
the Sartorius doctrine.
In The Rudolph Wurlitser Co.15 the NLRB, Smith dissenting, over-
ruled the Sartorius case and' held that, in the case of an economic strike,
both strikers and replacements are entitled to vote in a representation elec-
tion. From the opinions in the Wurlitzer case it does not clearly appear-
whether the Board intends to hold all employees hired to replace the strikers
eligible to vote, or to make a distinction between replacements hired as
permanent employees and those hired merely for the duration of the strike.'
6
8. Lenox Shoe Co., Inc., 4 N. L. R. B. 372 (1937); Friedman Blau Farber Co.,
4 N. L. R. B. 151 (1937).
9. 9 N. L. R. B. 19 (938), modified, io N. L. R. B. 493 (1938).
io. American Newspapers, Inc., 22 N. L. R. B. 899 (194o); Easton Publishing
Co., i N. L. R. B. 389 (1940), 53 ]-AV. L. REv. 885; Aronsson Printing Co., 13 N. L.
R. B. 799 (1939).
ii. Dr. Millis was appointed chairman of the Board on November 29, 1940.
12. 30 N. L. R. B. No. lO4 (1941).
13. Id. at 4.
14. Id. at 5. Whether the company meant that it would discharge the replacements
to make room for the strikers, or merely that it would reinstate the strikers insofar as
possible without discharging the replacements, is not made clear.
15. 32 N.-L. R. B. No. 35 (94).
16. The former position is indicated in the statement in the majority opinion: "The
persons in question are employees of the Company and as such are entitled to partici-
pate in the selection of the bargaining representative of such employees." Id. at 4.
That some distinction may be made is indicated in Millis's supplementary opinion: "In
cases of this type-strikes of the non-unfair labor practice category, with positioms filled
by individuals fron; the local tabor markets- . . . both the strikers and those who
have been hired to replace them should be permitted to vote." Id. at 6 (italics sup-
plied). That the Board contemplates some such distinction is also indicated in an argu-
ment to support the decision contained in Millis's supplementary opinion. In answer to
the argument in support of the Sartorius rule, that the jobs of so-called strikebreakers
are tenuous, Millis replied: "The same is true of the jobs of employees engaged in an
economic strike, particularly when the struggle lasts for weeks or months." Inherent
in this discussion is the assumption that the "so-called strikebreakers" were hired as
permanent employees.
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However, the subsequent case of Estate of Frank Newfield, Inc.,'7 which
followed the Wurlitzer case, would seem to indicate that no such distinction
will be made.
18
RULES UNDER THE STATE LABOR RELATIONS ACTS
In the Wisconsin Labor Relations Act persons hired to replace strikers
were made ineligible to vote by their express exclusion from the definition
of employee.' 9 However, the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act,20 which
repealed the first mentioned act, omitted the express exclusion contained in
the earlier act. The question as to the eligibility to vote of strikers and
replacements has not been decided by the Wisconsin labor conciliator.2 '
The New York State Labor Relations Act excludes from its definition
of employees "any individuals employed only for the duration of a labor
dispute," 22 and expressly provides that such individuals shall not be eligible
to vote in an election of bargaining representatives.23  The use of the above
phrase in the New York Act would seem to indicate that the legislature
intended to distinguish between strikebreakers whom the employer hired
only until the strikers should decide to return to work and strikebreakers
whom the employer intended should permanently displace the strikers.
Such, however, has not been the interpretation adopted by the New York
Board. The Board has consistently held that all persons hired to replace
strikers fall within the exclusion of the New York Act,24 adopting in effect
the Sartorius doctrine of the NLRB. The Rhode Island Act likewise
excludes from its definition of employee "any individuals employed only for
the duration of a labor dispute." 25 It does not expressly provide that such
individuals shall not be eligible to vote in representation elections, but such
a result should naturally follow without an express provision to that effect.
17. 34 N. L. R. B. No. 9 (I94I) (Smith dissenting in part).
i8. In that case three persons were hired to replace strikers. Without making any
finding as to whether the replacements were hired from the local labor market, or
whether they were hired as permanent or temporary employees, the Board simply said:
"These three persons are employees of the Company and as such are entitled to partici-
pate in the selection of the bargaining representative of such employees." Id. at 5.
1g. Wis. Sess. Laws 1937, c. 51, § 111.02 (3) : "The term 'employe' . . . does not
include any individual employed takifhg the place of employes whose work has ceased
as aforesaid [by strike]. . ....
20. WIs. STAT. (I939) C. III.
21. The definition of employee in the present Wisconsin act involves so confusing
an example of legislative draftsmanship as to warrant hesitation in making any predic-
tion as to what the labor conciliator will decide when the question arises. Section
111.02 (3) provides: "The term 'employe' shall include any [striker] . . . (d) who
has not been absent from his employment for a substantial period of the time during
which reasonable expectancy of settlement has ceased . . . and whose place has been
filled by another engaged in the regular manner for an indefinite or protracted period
and not merely for the duration of a strike or lockout. . . " What the legislature
probably meant to say is that a striker ceases to be an employee when he has remained
on strike for a substantial period of time during which reasonable expectancy of settle-
ment has ceased and his place has been filled by a person hired, not merely for the dura-
tion of the strike, but as a permanent employee. If such is the proper interpretation,
then a criterion is presented as to how long the striker will be entitled to vote. The
value of such a criterion is questionable due to the inevitable difficulties in application
which it would entail. This of course does not necessarily answer the question whether
the replacement is entitled to vote before the replaced striker loses his right.
22. N. Y. CONS. LAws (Thompson, 1939) c. 31, § 701 (3).
23. Id. at § 705 (4).
24. Ace Shirt Laundry, Inc., 5 LAB. REL. REP. 669 (1940) ; Divan Parisien, Inc., 2
LAB. REL. REP. 586 (1938); Wallach, Inc., i LAB. RaL. REP. 361 (1937).
25. R. I. Acts and Resolves ig4i, c. Io66, § 2 (3).
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Whether the Rhode Island Board will follow the interpretation of the
above-mentioned phrase adopted by the New York Board remains to be
seen.
The pertinent provisions of the Massachusetts, 26 Minnesota 27 and
Pennsylvania 28 labor relations acts are substantially the same as those of
the National Labor Relations Act.2 9  The question has not been passed
upon by the Massachusetts or Minnesota boards. In Penn Athletic Club
of Philadelphia5 0 the Pennsylvania Board ruled, where the strikers had
been completely replaced and the employer's operations had been very
nearly normal for a considerable time, that only the replacements were
entitled to vote in a representation election, that the strikers were not
entitled to vote. The opinion indicates that in the more normal situation,
where the strikers have not been completely replaced and are still exerting
a real economic pressure on the employer, the Pennsylvania Board would
hold both strikers and replacements entitled to vote.8'
EVALUATION OF THE VAIous RULES
The labor relations acts all provide that the exclusive representative
shall be the one selected by the majority of "employees" and that the boards
may take a ballot of "employees" to determine the representative.8 2  Selec-
tion by "employees" is contemplated. However the definitions of the term
"employee" contained in the acts merely involve express inclusions within
and exclusions from the term,"" so that, aside from these inclusions and
exclusions, the term is left for definition by boards or courts.
There being no definite statutory yardstick controlling the decision as
to who should be entitled to vote in an election, the question would best be
26. 4 MASS. ANN. LAws (Supp. 1940) c. 15oA.
27. 3 MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 194o) c. 23, § 4254-21-4254-40.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, .I941) tit. 43, §§ 211.1-211.13.
29. See p. 947 supra.
30. Pa. Labor Relations Board, No. 64 (Sept. 23, i941), 9 LAM RM. REP. 175.
31. As regards the replacements the Board said: "There can be no question that
the persons who hAve replaced the strikers are also 'employes within the meaning of
the Act'." Thus on the basis of the legal statu, of the replacement as an employee the
Board justified his right to vote. As to the strikers, however, the Board justified its re-
fusal to permit them to vote on the peculiar economic fact of the case that there was
practically no possibility that the strikers could compel the employer to give them back
their jobs. "For the hard fact remains, and is inescapable, that the strike has cost the
striking employes their jobs."
32. 49 STAT. 453 (935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 159 (Supp. 1940) ; 4 MASS. ANN. LAWS
(Supp. 1940) c. I5oA, §5; 3 MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §4254-36; N. Y.
CONS. LAWS (Thompson, 1939) c. 31, § 705; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1940) tit. 43,
§ 211.7; R. I. Acts and Resolves 1941, c. lo66, § 6; Wis. STAT. (1939) c. iII, § .o5.
33. 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (3) (Supp. 1940): "The term 'em-
ployee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a par-
ticular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any indi-
vidual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any currerit
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any
other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any indi-
vidual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or
person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse." The Massa-
chusetts, New York, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes contain substantially
identical provisions, except, in some instances, for differences in the express inclusions
and exclusions. The Minnesota statute is slightly more definitive, provides: "'Em-
ployee' includes, in addition to the accepted definition of the word. . . ." 3 MINN.
STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) § 4254-21 (c). The Wisconsin statute is most definitive,
defining the term, subject to express exclusions and inclusions, as "any person .
working for hire in the state of Wisconsin in a nonexecutive or nonsupervisory capac-
ity. . . ." WIs. STAT. (1939) c. III, § .02.
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answered by considering what decision in a particular instance will most
nearly effectuate the basic purposes and aims of the acts.1
4
One of the basic principles contained in the Act is that of majority
rule 85 The question arises: should the majority rule in this situation look
solely to the time of the negotiations or to the period during which the
collective contract is in force as well? It is submitted that the latter con-
sideration should be a determining factor, that it is pertinent to inquire
concerning the particular individual or group under consideration whether
this individual or group will be working for this employer when the con-
templated collective contract is in effect. It is undeniable that the persons
who will be directly affected in their conditions of employment by the col-
lective contract have the real interest in the terms of the contract, and
should therefore be entitled to select the representative who will negotiate it;
and, conversely, that a person who, though presently working for the
employer, will not be working when the contract is in force, should not be
entitled to participate in the selection of the representative who will nego-
tiate it. Although the propriety of this proposition be admitted in the
abstract, its application may be considerably restricted by the difficulty or
impossibility, as a practical matter, of answering the question which it
presents-whether X will or will not be employed six months or a year
from now is often an unanswerable question.
The NLRB has in effect admitted the validity of the proposition in
election cases in which no strike was in progress. An example is the
Board's practice of permitting persons who have been laid off to vote where
it is likely that they will be reemployed. ° The use of the test restrictively
to deprive persons who would ordinarily be considered employees, of the
right to vote in an election, is illustrated in Androscoggin Mills 7 where it
appeared that in about ten weeks certain employees would be discharged
due to a change in plant operations, and the Board excluded the employees
who were to be discharged.
It is submitted that the sole justification for permitting replacements
to vote in the election can be found, if at all, in the effectuation of this
"forward-looking" majority rule principle. The hiring of replacements by
the employer is fundamentally an economic weapon to defeat the strike by
nullifying the effect of the walk-out by the strikers. A rule which would
permit the activities of the employer in this regard to affect the legal rights
of the strikers cannot be justified by any argument as to the rights of the
employer, who under the theory of the Act has no interest in the determi-
nation of the representative. It must be justified, if at all, on the basis of
34. The discussion which follows, insofar as specific allusions are made to "basic
aims and purposes", will be based upon the National Act. However, the discussion will
be equally applicable to the state acts, which were enacted to achieve the same pur-
poses in local industry.
35. See note 27 supra.
36. See, for example, National Distillers Products Co., 5 N. L. R. B. 862 (1938).
Here the company normally had three months of peak production from October through
December. Its seasonal employees were usually reemployed, each year, were women
who did not often find other employment during the year. The'Board held entitled to
vote all persons who, though laid off, had been employed for at least four weeks during
the preceding peak production period. The Board said, at 865, that such persons "are
likely to be reemployed at some future date, and accordingly have an interest in condi-
tions of employment which might be agreed upon during the year even though not em-
ployed at the particular time the agreements were made. That interest entitles them to
particpate in the selection of representatives." See also Paragon Rubber Co., 6 N. L. R.
B. 23 (1938), in which persons laid off because of seasonal slump and whom the com-
pany expected to reemploy when business picked up, were permitted to vote even though
they had obtained employment elsewhere.
37. 26 N. L. R. B. No. 75 (1940).
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the interests of the replacements, who. have no real interest in the selection
of the bargaining representative unless they will be employed when the con-
templated collective bargaining contract is in force.8
It was held in N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.8 9 that,
as between striker and replacement, in an economic strike, neither has a
legal right40 to be employed after the strike. Therefore neither certainty
nor probability of the future employment of either striker or replacement
can be found in their legal status as such. It is obvious, however, that as
a practical matter, as regards certain replacements in certain situations,
there is not even a probability of their employment after the strike. The
strikers will always seek the discharge of replacements and reinstatement
'of all the strikers, and no question will even arise unless the employer
desires to retain certain replacements. Since in the normal situation the
employer has an "investment" in the skill and experience of the strikers, it
may be assumed that usually, where the strike is of short duration and the
replacements have not acquired skill and experience in their jobs, the
employer will prefer to take back the strikers upon the termination of the
strike. Likewise it is common knowledge that in many instances replace-
ments are hired solely to break the strike and with no intention of retaining
them after the strike is ended. It is apparent, then, that what, if any,
replacements will be employed after the strike depends upon (i) the inten-
tion of the employer in the matter (which may change as the strike is pro-
longed), and, (2) where the employer intends to retain the replacement,
the success of the strikers in persuading him to change his mind. Admit-
tedly the "forward-looking" majority rule principle would not justify voting
by a replacement who has no possibility of being employed after the strike.
On the other hand, an attempt to distinguish between the two types of
replacements would probably prove a practical administrative impossibil-
ity.41 If for this reason the choice must be between permitting all replace-
38. Another possible argument is that in the case of a prolonged strike which
eventually fails completely, with the replacements remaining as permanent employees,
the replacements and non-strikers, though a majority, will have been deprived for a
substantial period of any right to negotiate a collective contract if the replacements
are not permitted to vote. Such an argument is not convincing when the realities of
the situation are considered. In the first place, it is not likely often to arise. And so
long as the strikers continue to exert economic force upon the employer, it is in the
interests of the replacements to remain on the job, since their jobs depend largely upon
the employer's winning the contest with the original strikers. Since the replacements
would in fact be without the weapon of an effective threat of strike, a contract which
they might negotiate at this stage would probably be largely on the employer's terms,
so that the right to make a contract during this period would be in fact illusory. And
when the strike has lost its economic force, has been in fact broken, another basis
arises by which the replacements would be entitled to bargain--viz, that there is no
longer a "current labor dispute" between strikers and employer, that the strikers are
no longer employees under the Act, and that the replacements are now employees and
entitled to select a representative and bargain with the employer.
39. 304 U. S. 333, 345 (1938) ; Black Diamond S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 94
F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 579 (1938).
40. It was held that the Board cannot order the discharge of such replacements to
make room for the strikers displaced. "Legal right to be employed" is used in the
sense of right to be employed enforceable by Board order.
41. See Note' (941) 55 HARV. L. REv. 269, 278, n. 78. While the Board enunci-
ates a technical rationale that the replacements are "employees" and as such entitled to
vote (see notes ii and 13 supra), its failure to attempt any distinction as to the nature
of the replacement may rest in a conviction of the impossibility of such an attempt as
a practical matter. Possibly indicative factors might be the wages paid the replace-
ments as compared with the wages normally paid, the previous working history of the
replacement, relative efficiency of strikers and replacements, whether the individual was
hired from the local labor market or imported from a distant point, and, of course, the
intentions of the parties involved. However, the difficulty of accurately determining
such factors is self-evident, particularly in view of the fact that one of the primary
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ments or no replacements to vote, it must be recognized that the per-
suasiveness of the majority rule justification is reduced proportionally as
non-permanent replacements are permitted to vote.
In view of the possible detrimental effect upon the rights of the strikers
which might result from permitting replacements to vote, it should first be
inquired whether the exclusion of replacements and the restricting of the
electorate to strikers and non-strikers (in the sense of original employees
who remained at their jobs) could result in a contract violative of the
majority rule principle. Such a result might occur in the following situ-
ation. Suppose a total working force of IOO. Fifty-one or more workers
strike. During the strike the employer hires enough replacements so that
non-strikers plus replacements total 51 or more. The strikers are exerting
sufficient economic force to compel the employer to sign a contract covering
all the employees, but the employer insists, and the strikers agree, that only
49 or less strikers shall be taken back. In this situation the contract would
have been negotiated with a representative of less than a majority of those
\ho are employed under it. Would such a result be upheld? The question
has not arisen before Board or courts. Either the affirmative or the negative
might well be argued.42 If such a contract were held invalid, it is apparent
that there could be no post-strike detriment to those replacements who in
fact turned out to be permanent, and the majority rule principle, which has
been demonstrated to be the sole justification for including even permanent
replacements in the electorate, would not be defeated even if they were
excluded. If it be assumed that the contract were upheld, and the inclusion
of replacements were necessary to effectuate the majority rule principle in
this situation, the question then arises whether the detrimental effect on the
strikers from replacements voting would defeat other purposes of the Act,
and if so, which of the considerations are weightier.
Assume that in the election the strikers' representative fails to secure
a majority vote due to the negative votes of the replacements, but the
replacements and non-strikers have no affirmative choice of representative.
The election would determine that the strikers' representative is not the
majority representative, and the strikers would thereby lose the legal right
that the employer bargain with them.48  Probably they would be free by
economic force to compel the employer to bargain with them and to nego-
sources of information, viz., the testimony of employer and replacement, would inevitably
tend to be colored by their personal interests in the outcome.
42. There is the rather technical argument for upholding the contract that the
strikers and non-strikers by hypothesis being the only persons entitled to select the
representative, and the representative being the majority choice of that group at the
time the contract is made (since even those strikers whom the union has agreed shall
not be reinstated remain technically "employees" under the Act so long as there is a
current labor dispute-i. e., until the strike is actually terminated), the contract is valid
as one negotiated by the majority representative. The more realistic and persuasive
argument would seem to be that where, in the very process of negotiating the contract,
the strikers bargain away the majority on which their authority rests, the resulting
contract should be held invalid as not negotiated with the majority representative.
43. Section 8 (5) of the Act provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer "To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his em-
ployees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a)." 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C.
A. § i58 (5) (Supp. 1940). Section 9 (a), enunciating the majority rule principle in
collective bargaining, provides that the representative selected by the majority of the
employees shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees. Ibid., 29 U. S. C.
A. § I59 (a) (Supp. 1940). Clearly the employer is under a duty to bargain with the
majority representative. However, Board and courts have held that the employer is
under no duty to bargain with a representative of less than a majority. N. L. R. B. v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (i939) ; N. L. R. B. v. Mooresville Cotton
Mills, 94 F. (2d) 6I, 65, on rehearmng, 97 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) ; Moores-
ville Cotton Mills, 2 N. L. R. B. 952, 955 (1937).
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tiate a valid contract with them as a minoiity group.44 And, if they could
force the employer to agree to discharge the replacements and restore the
strikers to their jobs, they could then compel him to bargain with them as
exclusive bargaining representative. 5  However, experience has shown
that bargaining during a strike often hastens its settlement and termina-
tion,4 and therefore the loss by the strikers of their legal right to bargain
with the employer would undeniably violate the express policy of the Act
of effectuating the rapid settlement of strikes.
4 7
Assume that the replacements and non-strikers, being in the majority,
have an affirmative choice of representative, and the election results in the
certification of an exclusive representative other than the representative of
the strikers. The strikers would of course lose the legal right that the
employer bargain with them. And the added factor of another certified
representative might result in further curtailment of the strikers' rights.
The employer would then be under a legal duty to bargain collectively with
the representative certified, 4 and would commit an unfair labor practice if
he were to bargain collectively with the strikers.4  And a collective contract
with the strikers covering all employees negotiated at this stage would be
void, as one negotiated with a minority representative. 50  Since the only
justification for permitting replacements to vote is that they may be em-
ployed after the strike, it would seem to follow that if the strikers could
force the employer to agree to discharge the replacements, and they thereby
became once again the de facto, though uncertified, majority representative,
they could then negotiate a valid contract with the employer. This, how-
ever, depends upon what effect the certification has-a matter which in this
regard is not settled-and it is possible that the strikers could not negotiate
a valid contract until they were able to obtain a subsequent certification as
44. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 237, 239 (1938) ;
Eastwood-Nealley Corp. v. International Association of Machinists, 124 N. J. Eq. 274,
281, 1 A. (2d) 477, 481 (Ch. 1938). But the validity of such a contract under the Act
might well be questioned. Assume that the contract with the minority union provided
for an increase in wages for the members of the union. If the employer paid the
higher wages to the union members and the lower wages which he had been paying
before the contract to his other employees, he would commit an unfair labor practice
under Section 8 (3) of the Act, which provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for the employer "By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization. . . ." 49 STAT. 452, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (3) (Supp. i94o). And
since the employer must pay all his employees the wages agreed to be paid to union
members, the result would be that the minority union is in effect bargaining as exclu-
sive bargaining representative for all the employees, which would seem to be a viola-
tion of the majority rule principle embodied in Section 9 (a).
45. In fact, if the employer agreed to discharge the replacements, and as a result
the strikers once again represented the majority, their legal right should once again
arise that the employer bargain with them as exclusive representatives.
46. See Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co. v. N. L. R. B., 91 F. (2d) 134, 139 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1937).
47. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 1I (Supp. 1940) : "It is hereby, declared
to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial ob-
structions to the free flow of commerce [strikes] and to mitigate and eliminate these ob-
structions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of col-
lective bargaining. .. "
48. See note 38 supra.
49. Matter of American France Line and International Seamen's Union of Amer-
ica, 7 N. L. R. B. 79 (1938) ; Matter of National Electric Products Corp. and United
Electrical and Radio Workers of America, 3 N. L. R. B. 475 (937) ; see N. L. R. B.
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. I, 45 (1937).
50. Matter of American France Line and International Seamen's Union of Amer-
ica, 7 N. L. R. B. 79 (1938).
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majority representative.," In any event the strikers might be forced to
settle the rehiring issue first, before continuing the negotiations on other
matters 12-a procedure which might prove- highly artificial and delay the
ultimate settlement in many cases. It is also possible that the strikers might
be enjoined from continuing the strike.5 3  These possible results would
Sr. The Act itself does not prescribe the effect of a Board certification. It is gen-
erally agreed that limits should be placed upon the freedom of employers to question
the continuing validity of. Board certifications. See (1942) 42 CoL. L. REV. 145, 147.
It has been held that an employer must continue to recognize a representative certified
as long as that certification remains in full force and effect. Valley Mould & Iron
Corp. v. N. L. R. B., i16 F. (2d) 760, 764 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) (distinguishable from
the instant situation, however, in that employer domination of the union later claiming
the majority was found by the Board). However, it has been held that if, due to a
change in circumstances not involving employer domination, a genuine question as to
the continued majority status of the certified representative is shown to exist, the Board
may not order bargaining with the certified representative, but must hold an election.
N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 3o6 U. S. 240, 261, 262 (1939) (here, how-
ever, more than a year had elapsed since the first certification). The precise question
has never been presented as to the legal consequences where an employer does in fact
bargain with and make an agreement with a representative who has in fact, and with-
out employer domination or encouragement, supplanted the certified representative as
the choice of the majority. The proper decision would appear to be to uphold the em-
ployer in his action and the resulting collective contract. The certification is, after all,
merely a formal pronouncement of an existing fact. Where the facts on which it rests
are admitted to have changed, little justification can be found for the continued vitality
of the pronouncement.
52. As has been noted, the employer would commit an unfair labor practice if he
were to "bargain collectively" with the strikers at this point. Presumably, however,
he would not be precluded from negotiating with the strikers on the rehiring issue.
Such negotiations are not properly "collective bargaining". Of course, the employer
would be negotiating with the strikers as a collectivity. However, such negotiations
would not result in a term of a collective contract controlling the future relations of
employer and his employees as a group-it is essentially a dispute as to which of two
individuals shall be employed. Furthermore to ban such negotiations would produce
the anomalous situation that while the strikers may force the employer to discharge
replacements and rehire the strikers, they may not discuss the matter with him. The
phrase "collective bargaining" is not defined by the Act, nor has it been defined by Board
or courts in this regard. However, assuming the conclusion that such negotiations
would be permitted, one is still forced logically to the artificial position that the strikers
must push to a successful conclusion the issue as to rehiring before they can proceed
to further negotiations on the terms of the contemplated contract.
53. It has been held that where a union has been certified by the N. L. R. B., in-
junctive relief will be granted against strikes by the minority. Oberman & Co. v.
United Garment Workers of America, 21 F. Supp. 20 (W. D. Mo. 1937) ; Bloedel
Donvan Lumber Mills v. International Woodworkers of America, 4 Wash. (2d) 62,
102 P. (2d) 270 (1940) ; Euclid Candy Co. of N. Y., Inc. v. Summa, 174 Misc. ig, ig
N. Y. S. (2d) 382 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ; cf. Union Premier Food Stores v. Retail Food C.
& M. Union, 98 F. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938); see International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, etc. of America v. International Union of United Brewery, etc. Workers
of America, io6 F. (2d) 871, 876 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) ; Houston & North Texas Mo-
tor Freight Lines, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. of America, 24
F. Supp. 61g, 640 (W. D. Okla. 1938) ; Eastwood-Nealley Corp. v. International Asso-
ciation of Machinists, 124 N. J. Eq. 274, 279, i A. (2d) 477, 480 (Ch. 1938). In the
first three cases cited, a majority representative had been certified and a collective con-
tract made with that representative. But where there was an existing contract with
a majority but not a ceffified representative, it has been held that an injunction will not
issue. Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union, io5 F. (2d) i (App.
D. C. 1939), aff'd, 308 U. S. 522 (1939) (per curiam decision). If the propriety of
an injunction is admitted where a contract is in force, it would seem that the injunc-
tion should likewise be proper where a representative has been certified but no contract
negotiated, the employer being under a legal duty to bargain with, and only with the
certified representative. See Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the
Development of Collective Bargaining (1937) 5o HAnv. L. REv. 1071, 1107.
The propriety of the entire doctrine is, however, open to serious question. In the
first three cases cited it was held that, one union having been certified as majority rep-
resentative, no "labor dispute" thereafter existed, and the anti-injunction statutes there-
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dearly violate the express provision that nothing in the Act shall curtail
the right to strike. 4 Before the Act, the hiring of replacements by the
employer could not affect the power of the strikers to negotiate a valid
contract, or the right of the employees to continue the strike. In these
eventualities, therefore, to permit replacements to vote would diminish the
rights of the strikers which existed prior to the Act.
Assume that the replacements and non-strikers elect a majority repre-
sentative and that a collective contract is made with that representative. In
addition to the above possible results, the existence of the contract might
place the strikers under further disabilities. There is an increased possi-
bility that a contract which the strikers would negotiate would be held
invalid,5" and that the continuance of the strike would be enjoined. 6 And
a continued strike in violation of the contract with the certified representa-
tive might be held a valid ground for the employer to discharge the
strikers, 57 thereby depriving them of their right under the Act that the
employer reinstate at least as many of the strikers as there are positions
unfilled when the strikers call off the strike.
The foregoing discussion reveals that the problematic violation of the
majority rule principle which might arise through permitting no replace-
ments to vote, is far outweighed by the certain and possible violations of
other basic purposes resulting from permitting replacements to vote. This
conclusion is further strengthened, as regards the NLRB rule of permitting
all replacements to vote, in that the persuasiveness of the majority rule
argument is considerably weakened where there is (probably of necessity)
no distinction made between "permanent" and "non-permanent" replace-
ments. And the evil of permitting replacements to vote is enhanced in
fore did not apply. That such a position, at least for the federal courts, is untenable
under subsequent broad definitions of the phrase "labor dispute" by the United States
Supreme Court, see Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union, supra
at 13; Cohen, The Miwrity Union's Right to Strike (I941) I6 I-D. L. J. 3771 391.
The question then arises whether the strike is unlawful because directed towards forc-
ing the employer to violate his duties under the N. L. R. A. or to breach a valid collec-
tive contract. That the answer should be in the negative, see Cohen, smpra at 392, 393.
54. Section 13 of the Act provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as
to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike." 49 STAT. 457
(1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 163 (Supp. 1940).
55. The effect of this added factor upon the rights of the strikers is not clear under
Board and court decisions. The Board, in petition proceedings for certification, has
recognized the validity of such contracts where they are to run for a reasonable time
and such time has not expired, by dismissing such petitions. Matter of the National
Sugar Refining Co. of N. J. and International Longshoremen's Ass'n, io N. L. R. B.
1410 (1939); Matter of Superior Electrical Products Co. and Metal Polishers, etc.
International Union, 6 N. L. R. B. i9 (1938); see Note (1939) 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rxv.
96. However, the validity or effect of a contract negotiated with a de facto but uncer-
tified representative to supplant an existing contract with a certifted representative has
not been decided. The above-mentioned certification decisions, insofar as they assume
the continuing validity of the original contract, might suggest a holding that such sub-
sequent contracts would be invalid. Where a new contract has been negotiated to sup-
plant a previously negotiated unexpired contract, the continuing validity of the original
contract has been recognized in an action at law on the original contract. Reichert et
al. v. Qnindazzi, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 284, 286 (Munic. Ct., City of New York, 1938). But
compare Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts (1938) 48 YALE L. 3.
195, 221, wherein the author, in discussing closed shop agreements, suggests that they
should be recognized as in force only so long as the contracting union maintains its
leadership in the employers plant, and as subject always to an implied condition that if
this leadership is lost, the union shall have no cause of action against the employer for
breach. See Notes (1940) 38 MIcir. L. REv. 516; (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 465.
56. See note 48 supra.
57. In N. L. R. B. v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 3o6 U. S. 332, 344 (1939), it was
held that where employees went on strike and thereby repudiated a valid collective
agreement then in force, this violation of the agreement constituted a ground for which
the employer could validly discharge the striking employees.
NOTES
view of the possibility that the rule may be utilized by employers as a
positive weapon, which may lead to fruitless pre-strike negotiations and
increase the probabilities of strikes. The employer knows that when a
strike occurs, if he can hire enough replacements, he can then refuse even
to meet with the strikers. This added weapon may well encourage him
(and increasingly so if any of the possible results suggested above should
materialize) to follow an uncompromising line in pre-strike negotiations
on the theory that the union will be more inclined to meet his terms than
to hazard the strike and that he will be able to defeat the strike through the
hiring of replacements if it does occur.
J: K. M.
Employee's Waiver of Extra Pay for Extra Services
When one person voluntarily performs services which benefit another
person, he cannot enforce a claim for compensation in return for the
services.1 He has no contractual obligation to perform the services. By the
same token, he has no power to impose an obligation upon the one who
has benefited from the services.
2
When an employer and an employee agree upon the terms of employ-
ment, however, the employee may enforce a claim for the amount stipu-
lated in the agreement. In addition to the contractual wage, the employee
may attempt to enforce a claim for extra compensation on the theory that
he performed greater services than were paid for by the contractual wage.8
When employees claim extra compensation for extra services, em-
ployers usually defend on the ground that the employees have waived any
right they might have.4 The waiver allegedly is found in the employees'
agreements - or in their conduct. 6 In some instances the most explicit
waiver has failed to avail the employer,7 whereas in other instances the
defense of waiver has been upheld upon slight evidence.8 The variance is
accounted for by different fact situations, by construction of agreements
and local statutes, and by the contemporary current of judicial sentiment
toward labor.
Given the contractual relation of employer and employee, the claim for
extra compensation may arise in four ways:
i. The employee performs services totally foreign to the terms of
employment.
2. The employee performs services beyond the scope of his regular
employment yet reasonably related to it.
3. The employee works longer periods of time than were agreed upon
in the employment contract.
4. The employee works longer periods of time than provided for in
legislative enactments which purport to affect hours of labor.
I. I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1936) § 26.
2. Id. at § 41.
3. U. S. v. Martin, 94 U. S. 400 (1876) ; Short v. Mining Co., 2o Utah 2o, 57 Pac.
720 (1899); Fleming v. Carleton Screw Products Co., 37 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn.
1941), aff'd, 126 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942).
4. Bartlett v. St. R. R., 82 Mich. 658, 46 N. W. 1034 (1&)o) ; Vogt v. Milwaukee,
99 Wis. 298, 74 N. W. 789 (x898).
5. Davis v. Boat Works, 121 Mich. 261, 8o N. W. 38 (1899).
6. U. S. v. Garlinger, i69 U. S. 316 (1898).
7. Fleming v. Carleton Screw Products Co., 37 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. I94I),
aff'd, 126 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942); Wright v. State, 223 N. Y. 44, 119 N. E.
83 (918).
8. Fitzgerald v. International Paper Co., 96 Me. 22o, 52 Atl. 655 (9o2) ; Woods v.
Woburn, 220 Mass. 416, 107 N. E. 985 (I915).
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WHERE THE SERVICES ARE TOTALLY FOREIGN TO THE TERms OF THE
CONTRACT
Where the employee performs services not mentioned in the contract
and quite foreign to it, he has no legal right to be paid for them. This is
a matter of simple contract lawY Thus, where an employee was hired as
a night watchman at night watchman's pay (small), but in fact did the
work of a pumper, he could not claim pumper's wages.' 0 There are no
cases controverting this proposition. It is not always clear, however, at
what point the employee's services cease to be rendered under the terms
of the contract." Other factors, however, help to determine the issue. If
extra services are rendered against the instructions of the employer, or if
the employee performs services which are exclusively the duty of other
employees, it is fairly clear that in performing such extra services the
employee is acting gratuitously. No express contract can be found here
and the actions of the employer effectively preclude the construction of an
implied contract. On the other hand, where the work done by the employee
is necessary to the performance of services expressly mentioned in the con-
tract, it is not hard to find from these circumstances that the employer
intended the work to be done and impliedly agreed to pay for it.
2
WHERE THE SERVICES ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT, YET REASONABLY RELATED TO IT
First, did the employer intend the employee to perform these services
at all? Second, if he did so intend, did he expect to receive the benefit of
the services gratis, or did he expect to pay extra for them? In deciding
the issue, it is well to determine whether the services were voluntary or
performed under some sort of compulsion on the part of the employer.'3
Compulsion by the employer may make the employee's claim enforceable on
the basis of implied contract.14 In the absence of compulsion and in the
absence of an agreement with respect to the extra services, the courts com-
monly find a presumption that no extra compensation is due.' 5 While this
is not the technical language of waiver, it amounts to the same thing. By
voluntarily performing services without first claiming extra pay at the
time the contract was made, and by not protesting at the time the contract
wage was paid, the employee is considered to have waived his rights to
such extra money.' 6 The courts have, therefore, required the employee
to act in a positive manner on pain of losing his rights.
The courts have seldom gone so far as to hold that an employee is
estopped to claim the extra wage, for that apparently requires a change of
position on the part of the employer.' 7 No such change of position can be
found in the usual case.
9. See note 2 supra. But see Gutweiler v. Lundquist, 200 Mo. App. 526, 207 S. W.
838 (I919), where the court intimated that if the work had been of a totally different
nature from that which he was hired to do, a contract to pay for it might be implied.
io. Hurt v. Edgell, 147 Kan. 234, 75 P. (2d) 834 (1938).
ii. See Lachine v. Manistique Ry., 126 Mich. 5,9, 85 N. W. 11o2 (19Ol).
12. Bachelder v. Bicldord, 62 Me. 528 (1872). ]But see MECHEM, AGacY (3d ed.
1923) §418; RE"TATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §444-
13. Fabris v. Sala, ii West. L. R. 269 (Yukon Terr. igo9).
14. Cf. Bachelder v. Bickford, 62 Me. 526 (1872).
15. Quirk v. Sunderlin, 23 Idaho 368, 130 Pac. 374 (1913) ; Webb v. Lees, 153 Pa.
436, 25 Atl. io8i (1893).
16. Quirk v. Sunderlin, 23 Idaho 368, 130 Pac. 374 (1913).
17. See Glendale v. Coquat; 46 Ariz. 478, 52 P. (2d) 1178 (I935).
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WHERE THE EMPLOYEE WORKS LONGER PERIODS OF TIME THAN WERE
AGREED UPON IN THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT
The problem of extra compensation also arises when an employee
works overtime. That is, where he works more hours than those stated
in the employment agreement, performing the same or similar services as
he performed during his regular working hours. If the parties have agreed
upon a stipulated overtime wage, no problem arises, but often the terms of
employment do not include any such provision, nor can such a claim be
predicated upon an implied contract based upon the conduct of the em-
ployer.' 8
The problem of extra pay for overtime arises where the agreement
stipulates the length of the working period. Suppose the agreement says
eight hours a day, and the employee works ten hours a day. The employee
claims that he has fulfilled his contractual obligation during the eight hours
and demands pay for the two hours excess. The majority of the cases hold
that the employee may not recover overtime pay in the absence of an
express agreement. One court refused recovery even though the employee
protested upon receiving his pay each month.19
It seems to make no difference whether the services were similar to
his regular duties, or were not within the immediate scope of his regular
employment. One court held that an employee was not entitled to over-*
time pay because the services were similar to his regular duties.20 Another
court reasoned that an employee could not recover because the services
were not in the immediate scope of his employment.
21
The decisions of the majority courts, disallowing the employee's claim,
seem to be based largely on convenience. It is easier for the courts to
award no overtime pay and thus discourage suits by disgruntled employees
than it is to hear many cases and award overtime pay after lengthy exam-
inations of obscure fact situations. The handiest reasoning is that of
waiver. It has the practical justification that the waiver is often actually
intended. Even though the employee may not have consciously waived
his rights, he probably hoped for, rather than expected, extra pay. There
is, therefore, some practical basis for the majority result.
On the other hand, it has been held that, although an endorsed check
purported to represent payment in full, the employee was permitted to
show that the check did not constitute an agreement that it was full pay-
ment.2 This case represents the minority view insofar as the court re-
fused to find that the employee had waived overtime pay by accepting the
check.
WHERE THE EMPLOYEE WORKS LONGER PERIODS OF TIME THAN ARE
SPECIFIED IN STATUTES PURPORTING TO AFFECT HOURS OF LABOR
Statutes setting the length of a working day have existed since the
middle of the nineteenth" century.22 While the purpose of the statutes has
not always been clear, the courts have commonly held that they were
designed to eliminate disputes between labor and management by giving
IS. Carrere v. Dun, IS Misc. IS, 41 N. Y. Supp. 34 (1896).
19. Robinette v. Hubbard Coal Mining Co., 88 W. Va. 514, 107 S. E. 285 (1921).
2o. Sheets v. Eales, 135 Kan. 627, II P. (2d) 1020 (1932).
2r. Carrere v. Dun, 18 Misc. 18, 41 N. Y. Supp. 34 (1896).
22. Yardley v. Iowa Electric Co., 195 Iowa 380, 191 N. W. 791 (1923).
23. See Luske v. Hotchkiss, 37 Conn. 219 (1870) ; Bachelder v. Bickford, 62 Me.
526 (1872).
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an employee the privilege of quitting work after a certain number of hours
without forfeiting his claim to a full day's pay.
2 4
One of the earliest cases involved a statute providing that ten hours
constituted a day's work, unless otherwise agreed. The case arose under
a contract of employment whereby the employee was paid by the day. No
hours of work were stipulated, and the employee worked from sunrise to
sunset. He therefore claimed extra pay, but the court held that the em-
ployer could not require the employee to work more than ten hours daily,
but that if he worked longer and accepted his pay without objection, he
thereby agreed that he was paid in full and could not recover for the over-
time.2 5
United States v. Martin,2" a leading case, came up under a federal
statute setting eight hours as a working day for government employees:
The court held that the statute did not preclude an agreement whereby an
employee would receive a day's pay for a longer working period than eight
hours, nor did it preclude an agreement as to how many hours should be
considered a working day. The Martin case was consistently followed by
the federal courts until 1941. Each decision was based on the thesis that
the hours of labor statutes were not intended to affect the amount of pay.
Most of the state and federal statutes passed before 1916 were for the
purpose of avoiding labor disputes and promoting uniformity of labor
standards rather than for promoting the welfare of the worker. Mindful
of this, the courts did not go out of their way to help the wage-earner.
In 1916, Congress passed the Adamson Act,2" originally entitled, "An
act to establish an eight hour day for employees of carriers engaged in
interstate and foreign commerce, and for other purposes." It provided that
"Eight hours shall . . . be deemed a day's work and the' measure or
standard of a day's-work for the purpose of reckoning the compensation
of all employees . . . employed by any . . . railroad." 28
There was some disagreement about the purpose of the Adamson Act.
An earlier statute in 1907 had also limited hours of railroad employees and
was entitled, "An act to promote the safety of employees and travellers
upon railroads by limiting the hours of service thereon." Safety was
emphasized and employee's wage standards were helped only incidentally.
The Adamson Act was subjected to the same interpretation with the result
that the idea of effecting safety excluded the idea of benefiting the workers.
In 193 o , a case 29 arose under the Adamson Act. An employee of a
railroad had worked more than eight hours a day and had accepted pay by
the day. The court held that the employee was entitled to no more than a
day's pay for each day's work.3' True, some right had been conferred on
the employee by the statute. He need not have worked more than eight
hours a day in return for a day's pay, but by failing to assert his right,
whatever benefit he might have had was waived.
24. Brooks v. Cotton, 48 N. H. 50 (1868).
25. Ibid.
26. 94 U. S. 400 (1876) ; see also Averill v. U. S., 14 Ct. Cl. 200 (1878) ; Swisher
v. U. S., 57 Ct. Cl. 123 (1922).
27. 39 STAT. 721 (I916), 45 U. S. C. A. § 65 (1928).
28. See note 27 supra.
29. Plummer v. P. R. R., 31 F. (2d) 123 (E. D. Ill. 1929), aff'd, 37 F. (2d) 874(C. C. A. 7th, 193o).
30. One state court arrived at a different interpretation of the same statute. An
employee who worked hours in excess of the statutory period was allowed to recover
extra pay. Nelson v. St. Joseph Ry., 199 Mo. App. 635, 205 S. W. 87o (1918).
NOTES
Most local statutes have been interpreted in the same way as the
federal statutes.31 The opinions of many courts contain language indicating
that they are based on the employee's having waived his rights.3 2 A few
courts say forthrightly that the employee is estopped to deny that he has
been paid in full when he accepts, without protest, the amount offered by
the employer.
3 3
A minority of courts have held that an employee may recover extra
pay for the hours worked in excess of the statutory period. One court
found an implied promise to pay the extra amount.34 A second court found
no implied promise to pay and based its decision on the fact that the em-
ployee understood (without justification, however) that he would receive
extra pay.3  A third court allowed recovery on the theory that the statute
was for the purpose of insuring prevailing wages for state employees and
public policy demanded that result.
3 6
Public policy has been used to embellish many opinions, and it
obligingly drapes itself over highly divergent views. It has been held that
where an employee worked longer than the statutory day he could not
recover, for he and his employer both had violated the statute.37 The court
refused to invoke the statute in favor of one who violated its terms. The
dissenting opinion in the same case emphasized the policy of protecting the
employee by enforcing extra pay for extra work.38
Another statute made it a crime to work more than eight hours a day.
A case under the statute held no recovery because extra pay for overtime
would encourage employees to work overtime.3 9  Thus the court proposed
to limit hours of labor by removing the incentive.
WAIVER OF OVERTIME PAY UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
With the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act,40 Congress left
no room for doubt as to its purpose. The Act is expressly dedicated to
the ". . . maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers." 41 In addition to
raising substandard living conditions it also proposes to decrease unem-
ployment and increase purchasing power.4 2 The purposes are to be accom-
plished in part by minimum wages for a normal work week and by extra
wages for overtime. Section 7(a) states:
31. Grisell v. Noel Bros. Flour-Feed Co., 5 Ind. App. 172, 36 N. E. 452 (1894);
Helphenstine v. Hartig, 9 Ind. App. 251, 31 N. E. 845 (1892); Thibault v. National
Tea Co., 198 Minn. 246, 269 N. W. 466 (1936); McCarthy v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. i
(884).
32. Fitzgerald v. International Paper Co., 96 Me. 220, 52 Atl. 655 (1902).
33. Davis v. Boat Works, 121 Mich. 261, 8o N. W. 38 (i89g) ; Bartlett v. St. R.
R., 82 Mich. 658, 46 N. W. 1034 (289o) ; Vogt v. Milwaukee, 99 Wis. 298, 74 N. W.
789 (i898).
34. Bachelder v. Bickford, 62 Me. 526 (1872).
35. O'Boyle v. Detroit, 131 Mich. 15, 90 N. W. 669 (29o2).
36. Wright v. State, 223 N. Y. 44, 11p N. E. 83 (2928).
37. Short v. Mining Co., 20 Utah 20, 57 Pac. 720 (899). See also Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Lusk, 52 S. W. (2d) iio (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
38. See note 37 supra.
39. Glendale v. Dixon, 51 Ariz. 206, 75 P. (2d) 683 (938).
40. Act of June 25, 1938, c. 676, §'1, 52 STAT. io6O, 29 U. S. C. A. § 207 et seq.
(Supp. 1941).
41. Ibid.; 29 U. S. C. A. §202 (a) (Supp. 1941).
42. See Missel v. Overnight Motor Tramp. Co., Inc., 4o F. Supp. 174, 179 (D.
Md. I94I), aff'd, 126 F. (2d) 98, ioo, lO3, io4 (C. C. A. 4th, i942). See also U. S. v.
Darby, 32 U. S. 100 (1941).
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"No employer shall . . . employ any of his employees . . . for a
work week longer than forty hours . . . unless such employee re-
ceives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above
specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate
at which he is employed." 43
May an employee waive his right to time and a half pay for overtime
under the Act? Nothing in the act specifically permits or prohibits the
waiver. Though few cases turning on this point have reached the appellate
courts,44 several have arisen in the District Courts.
In Reeves v. Howard County Refining Co.,45 a District Court decision,
an employee received $II0 per month. After the FLSA was passed, he
was told that he would receive $ii0 per month, for ten hours work a day,
and overtime for hours in excess of ten. The employee made no protest
at the time. , The court refused recovery on the ground that the employee
had agreed to a new schedule of hours and a new rate of pay. The court
apparently gave effect to the new agreement as a waiver by the employee
of the rights given him by the FLSA.40
An Appellate Court reached a contrary result in Fleming v. Carleton
Screw Products Co.,47 where, after the passage of the FLSA, employees
agreed to a lower rate of pay, so that their base pay plus overtime pay
would equal the amount they received before the FLSA was passed. The
agreement was held ineffective on the ground that it attempted to circum-
vent the Act by means of a fictitious rate of pay. The policy behind the
Act rendered void the attempt of the employees to waive the benefits due
them under the Act.48
The decision in the latter case reaches the better result. The relation
between employer and employee, and prevailing rates of pay, are matters
of public interest. The FLSA regulates employment agreements in the
public interest. In order to effectuate its purposes, agreements which
might constitute valid contracts and valid defenses as between the parties
need not be enforced when the general welfare hangs in the balance.49
If the courts do wish to effectuate the purposes of the Act, as in the
Carleton Screw case, they will not hesitate to look through obvious devices
designed to circumvent the Act.50 Arrangements whereby the employee
accepts less than his regular wage, or agrees not to claim extra wages for
extra work, or signs "payment in full" for less than is due him, or agrees
to waive the benefits due him under the FLSA, will not avail the em-
ployer.5 1 But subtler devices may escape detection and'may be more diffi-
43. 52 STAT. 1063 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §207 (a) (Supp. 1941).
44. Fleming v. Carleton Screw Products Co., 37 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1941)
aff'd, 126 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) ; see also Fleming v. Warshawsky & Co.,
123 F. (2d) 622 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941)'.
45. 33 F. Supp. 9o (N. D. Tex. 1940).
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NOTES
cult to expose. For example, an employer allows his employees to work
48 hours per week, if they wish to work more than the forty hour week,
but he does not urge them to do so. He initiates a piecework system,
paying his employees $i per piece. Employee A finishes one piece per
hour. At the end of the 48 hour week, the employer presents A with a
paper writing in the form of a receipt (a common adjunct to payroll
records). The receipt says:
"Received for the forty hour week ending June I, 1942, $48 in full
payment for work to date, 48 pieces at $i per piece."
A signs the receipt and receives $48. Can A claim pay in addition to the
$48, on the theory that he is entitled to time and a half for overtime?
The employer may argue that he is not liable for overtime pay, for the
following reasons: First, .4 really worked on his own time and the em-
ployer merely contributed the working facilities. Second, A was paid in
full for every piece finished and there was no agreement to pay by the
hour. Since hours were not a part of the contract, they were a matter of
choice on the part of the employee, and the fact that A chose to work long
hours should not subject the employer to increased liability. Third, the
receipt constitutes a waiver of extra pay. Fourth, .4 is estopped to deny
that he has worked a 4o-hour week, for he signed a paper so stating.
None of these arguments is valid. The employer can prevent work
in excess of forty hours, thus curbing the forces of economic compulsion.
The employer himself has exerted some compulsion on the employee by
presenting such a receipt to the employee for signing. The employer has
the benefit of legal counsel before he adopts these methods; the employee
has no similar advice.
When the camouflage is removed, the stark fact remains-A is work-
ing overtime without extra pay and the FLSA was designed to prevent
just this. The employer should not be permitted to defy the purpose of
the Act by circumlocution.
The disparity in knowledge and bargaining power of employer and
employee can be equalized only if courts look behind the technical devices
and condemn them as contrary to the spirit of the FLSA.
R. E. N., Jr.
